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I sometimes wonder whether some proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or physician-assisted death (PAD) think they own the copy-
right to such catchy phrases as “death with dignity” 
and “a good death” so that if you are against PAS or 
PAD, then you must be against a dignified death or 
a good death. If one removes the quotation marks 
around phrases like “aid-in-dying” or “compassionate 
care for the dying,” I am not opposed to such end-of-
life care either. Indeed, how could anybody be against 
this type of care?
I do not want to abandon dying patients anymore 
than Dr. Timothy Quill does.1 Although, unfortunately, 
it will not always be easy to achieve the desired result,2 
I agree with him that it ought to be a goal of medicine 
“to help people die well, to help them receive a good 
death” — or at least “the best possible” death under the 
circumstances.3 I part company with Professor Quill, 
however, when he urges us to change the law in the 
majority of our states so that in some circumstances 
patients may achieve a “good death” or a “dignified” 
one by means of lethal drugs.
As the co-founder of the Hastings Center, Daniel 
Callahan, has observed:
Consider the phrase “death with dignity” [the title 
of the Oregon and Washington physician-assisted 
suicide legislation]. The implication of the phrase is 
that physician-assisted suicide is the only route to a 
death with dignity.…Why does suicide endow a death 
with dignity? Does dignity depend upon control?4
I share the view of medical ethicist John Arras, a well-
known opponent of PAS, that — without changing the 
prevailing law — physicians opposed to PAS can do 
much to bring about the best death possible:
[They] must learn how to really listen to their 
patients, to unflinchingly engage them in sensitive 
discussion of their needs and the meaning of their 
requests for assisted death, to deliver appropriate 
palliative care, to distinguish fact from fiction in the 
ethics and law of pain relief, to diagnose and treat 
clinical depression, and, finally, to ascertain and 
respect their patients’ wishes for control regarding 
the forgoing of life-sustaining treatment.5
In early 2010, sisters Eileen and Jeanne Fitzpatrick 
co-authored A Better Way to Die. Written by Eileen, an 
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attorney, and Jeanne, a physician with extensive expe-
rience in treating seriously ill and dying patients, the 
book is all about how not to abandon dying patients. 
But there is no discussion of physician-assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia — except to compare and contrast 
it with what the authors call “Comfort Care Only”:
Patients choosing Comfort Care Only are not ask-
ing their doctors or family members to hasten or 
cause death by, for example, administering seda-
tives or other lethal medications. They are merely 
asking that those interventions administered to 
keep them alive in the past…be withheld so that 
they may take advantage of their next naturally 
occurring opportunity to die.6
Allowing a “natural death” to occur is what the Fitz-
patrick sisters mean when they write about “aid-in-
dying” and “physician-assisted death.”7
As I have discussed elsewhere, too often a reporter 
believes that the way to provide in-depth coverage of 
the general subject of PAS is not to dwell on, or even 
discuss, what may be best for society as a whole, but to 
furnish a detailed account of a particular person suf-
fering from a particular excruciating disease and ask: 
“How can we deny this person the active intervention 
of another to bring about death?” or “What would you 
want if you were in this person’s shoes?”8
However, as Professor Arras has pointed out, whether 
we maintain the legal status quo or whether we legalize 
PAS, “there are bound to be victims.”9 The victims of the 
current ban “are easy to identify; they are in the news, 
the talk shows [and] the documentaries.”10 By contrast, 
the victims of legalization “will be largely hidden from 
view.” But they “will include the clinically depressed 
eighty-year-old man who could have lived for another 
year of good quality if only he had been treated [and] 
the fifty-year-old woman who asks for death because 
doctors in her financially stressed health maintenance 
organization cannot or will not effectively treat her 
unrelenting but mysterious pelvic pain.”11
What do I mean by looking past some heart-wrench-
ing individual cases and thinking about what is best 
for society as a whole? In 1994, the New York State 
Task Force on Life and the Law, a 24-person group of 
physicians, lawyers, religious leaders, phi-
losophers, and medical ethicists, issued a 
highly influential report on “assisted suicide 
and euthanasia in the medical context.”12 The 
executive director of the task force told us that 
many of its members could envision some 
exceptional circumstances where PAS would 
be “ethically acceptable.”13 Nonetheless, the 
task force unanimously concluded that the 
prohibition against PAS should remain in 
force.14 “At the heart of this issue,” emphasized the task 
force director, “is the difference between individual 
ethics and the development of public policy.”15
I. “Organized Obfuscation”
In 2009, “Compassion & Choices,” an organization 
that advocates the legalization of PAS, sent out a letter 
to the public seeking contributions.16 On the first page 
of this letter, the head of the organization, Barbara 
Combs Lee, wrote:
When you shake your head in dismay and disgust 
over what happened to Terri Schiavo…when you 
read about a hospital refusing a patient’s writ-
ten wishes to be kept off artificial life support…
Compassion & Choices is the organization you can 
count on to stand up for what you know is right.17
The literature accompanying this solicitation letter pro-
files three “clients” of the organization who benefited 
from its work.18 One of them was Sandy Bush, who 
informed readers, shortly before he died of prostate 
cancer, that, thanks to Compassion & Choices, he was 
spared the ordeal of dying “hooked up to machines, 
unable to breathe or exist without a feeding tube.”19
A person unfamiliar with the ethics and law govern-
ing end-of-life medical treatment who read this letter 
and the accompanying literature would have no idea 
that for many years there has been wide agreement 
among physicians, lawyers, medical ethicists, and 
judges that the right of a competent person to forgo 
life-sustaining medical treatment is “virtually abso-
lute.”20 Although he did not cite the letter from Com-
passion & Choices as a specific example, this must 
be at least a first cousin to what Daniel Callahan had 
in mind when he protested recently that “many (but 
hardly all) advocates of euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide” have been engaging in “organized 
obfuscation.”21
I share the view of medical ethicist John 
Arras, a well-known opponent of PAS, that 
— without changing the prevailing law — 
physicians opposed to PAS can do much to 
bring about the best death possible.
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II. “Killing” vs. “Letting Die”: The Courts 
Grapple with the Issue
A. The Cruzan Case
Although the Cruzan case22 is often called a “right to 
die” case, it involved a woman (Nancy Cruzan) who 
had been in a persistent vegetative state for many 
years and was being kept alive by means of a feeding 
tube. Thus, she could not consent to her death nor ask 
anyone to help her die. Moreover, she had not made 
a living will nor executed any other advance directive 
requesting that she be allowed to die under certain 
circumstances.
Ms. Cruzan’s parents sought to discontinue the 
tubal feeding, but their efforts were rebuffed — first 
by hospital officials and then by the state courts. In 
the absence of any advance directive, ruled the state 
supreme court, Ms. Cruzan’s parents had to satisfy 
an unusually high burden of proof. They had to show 
“clear and convincing” evidence of their daughter’s 
wish to be free of life support. This they had failed to 
do.23
By a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court, per Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the state court. However, 
the Chief Justice recognized that “[t]he principle that 
a competent person has a constitutionally protected 
liberty in refusing unwanted medical treatment may 
be inferred from our prior decisions.”24 The Court then 
assumed “for purposes of this case that the Constitu-
tion would grant a competent person a constitution-
ally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition.”25
Significantly, five other members of the Court — 
concurring Justice O’Connor (who provided the cru-
cial fifth vote for Rehnquist) and the four dissenters 
(Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) — did 
not merely assume that a competent person had a 
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment (including 
hydration and nutrition). They asserted that a compe-
tent person had such a right.26
It is worth noting that the Cruzan Court seems to 
have attached no significance whatever to the fact 
that Nancy Cruzan was not “terminally ill” (as that 
condition is usually defined). By the time her case 
was decided by the Supreme Court, Ms. Cruzan had 
been in a persistent vegetative state for seven years. 
Moreover, if Ms. Cruzan’s parents had not been able to 
obtain a new hearing in the state probate court after 
they had lost in the Supreme Court — a hearing which 
soon led to the termination of Nancy’s nutrition and 
hydration27 — their daughter, as dissenting Justice 
Brennan described it, might have “remain[ed] a pas-
sive prisoner of medical technology” for another 30 
years!28
Worth noting, too, is that the author of the majority 
opinion in Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist, seemed 
to draw no distinction between the feeding tube and 
other lifesaving medical treatment (LSMT). Moreover, 
concurring Justice O’Connor explicitly and emphati-
cally rejected any such distinction.29
B. The Glucksberg and Quill Cases
Glanville Williams, whose highly influential 1957 
book30 may be said to have launched the modern era 
of the “physician-assisted death” movement, once said 
that “[a] toehold for euthanasia [or, one might add, 
PAS] is provided by the practice of letting die, or what 
is called passive euthanasia.”31 The equating of “letting 
die” with PAS helped produce a stirring battle cry — 
the “right to die.”32
A generation later, Williams’ comment looked like 
a gross understatement. For in 1996, within the span 
of a single month, two federal courts of appeals (the 
Second and Ninth Circuits)33 concluded that in cer-
tain circumstances there was indeed a constitutional 
right to physician-assisted suicide. Along the way, 
both courts shattered (for 16 months, at any rate)34 
what had been a general consensus that forgoing life-
sustaining medical treatment was neither suicide nor 
homicide.
As Alexander Morgan Capron summed up its rea-
soning,35 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit viewed the right to forgo unwanted medical treat-
ment and the right to enlist the aid of a physician in 
order to die by suicide as merely “subcategories” of the 
same broad right — “controlling the time and manner 
of one’s death” or “hastening one’s death.”36
It would be no exaggeration to say that the Ninth 
Circuit disdained the distinction between “letting die” 
and actively intervening to promote or to bring about 
death:
[W]e see no ethical or constitutionally cognizable 
difference between a doctor’s pulling the plug on 
a respirator and his prescribing drugs which will 
permit a terminally ill patient to end his own life. 
In fact, some might argue that pulling the plug is 
a more culpable and aggressive act on the doctor’s 
part and provides more reason for criminal pros-
ecution. To us, what matters most is that the death 
of the patient is the intended result as surely in one 
case as in the other….[W]e see little basis for [clas-
sifying the death of patients who take lethal drugs 
as “suicide”] when deaths that result from patients’ 
decisions to terminate life support systems or to 
refuse life-sustaining food and water, for example, 
are not….37
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While the Ninth Circuit had relied on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Cir-
cuit invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the same 
amendment. The Equal Protection Clause, observed 
the Second Circuit, “directs that ‘all similarly circum-
scribed shall be treated alike,’”38 but, it maintained, 
New York has failed to do so:
Withdrawal of life support requires physicians or 
those acting at their direction physically to remove 
equipment.…The ending of life by these means is 
nothing more nor less than assisted suicide. It sim-
ply cannot be said that those mentally competent, 
terminally-ill persons who seek to hasten death, 
but whose treatment does not include life support 
are treated equally.39
Most of the two million people who die in this country 
every year do so in hospitals and long-term care insti-
tutions and most of them die “after a decision to forgo 
life-sustaining treatment has been made.”40 Under the 
Quill court’s logic, therefore, quipped George Annas, 
“there is an epidemic of suicide and homicide in the 
nation’s hospitals.”41 
Nor is that all. Although I suspect many people are 
not aware of this, the right to forgo lifesaving medical 
treatment is not limited to the terminally ill. The belief 
that it is so limited is one of the “myths” that Alan Mei-
sel, the leading treatise writer on the general subject, 
exploded nearly two decades ago.42 This means a per-
son with a long life expectancy may refuse to have her 
leg amputated even though she may die of gangrene 
as a result or may refuse to have a heart bypass opera-
tion performed even though it may extend her life by 
10 years. Or people may refuse to go on dialysis even 
though they could live for many more years if they did 
so — or, once on it, change their minds and get off.43
If one adopts the Second Circuit’s reasoning in the 
Quill case — i.e., terminally ill people off life support 
are entitled to control the time and manner of their 
deaths because they are “similarly situated” to ter-
minally ill people on life support who do have such a 
right because they can reject life support — it seems to 
follow that non-terminally ill people who do not need 
any lifesaving medical treatment are entitled to con-
trol the timing of their deaths, i.e., enlist the assistance 
of a physician in committing suicide, because they are 
“similarly situated” to non-terminally ill patients who 
do need but may reject life-sustaining medical treat-
ment and thereby control the timing of their deaths. 
In short, if one takes the reasoning of the Second Cir-
cuit seriously, it seems to lead to the conclusion that 
there is a general right to PAS — not one merely lim-
ited to the terminally ill.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed both the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuit decisions without a single 
dissent. In an opinion designated as “the opinion 
of the Court,”44 Chief Justice Rehnquist forcefully 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in the Glucks-
berg case:
…
The right assumed in Cruzan…was not simply 
deduced from abstract concepts of personal auton-
omy. Given the common-law rule that forced medi-
cation was a battery, and the long legal tradition 
protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent 
with this Nation’s history and constitutional tra-
ditions. The decision to commit suicide with the 
assistance of another may be just as personal and 
profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medi-
cal treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal 
protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and rea-
sonably regarded as quite distinct.45
Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote the opinion of the 
Court in Vacco v. Quill, the companion case to Glucks-
berg. He was no more impressed with the Second Cir-
cuit’s equal protection reasoning than he had been 
with the Ninth Circuit’s due process analysis. He was 
unable to see how New York’s ban on assisting suicide 
while permitting patients to refuse medical treat-
ment drew any distinctions (invidious or otherwise) 
between people:
Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is enti-
tled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving 
medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a 
suicide.46
As for the Second Circuit’s argument that “ending or 
refusing lifesaving medical treatment ‘is nothing more 
nor less than assisted suicide’”:47
In short, if one takes the reasoning of the Second Circuit seriously,  
it seems to lead to the conclusion that there is a general right to PAS —  
not one merely limited to the terminally ill.
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Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinc-
tion between assisting suicide and withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely 
recognized and endorsed in the medical profession 
and in our legal traditions, is both important and 
logical; it is certainly rational.48
Nor is that all:
[T]he overwhelming majority of state legislatures 
have drawn a clear line between assisting suicide 
and withdrawing or permitting lifesaving medical 
treatment by prohibiting the former and permitting 
the latter.…[E]ven as the States move to protect 
and promote patients’ dignity at the end of life, they 
remain opposed to physician-assisted suicide.49
C. Baxter v. Montana
In December of 2008, a district court judge in Mon-
tana decided that competent terminally ill patients 
and their physicians had rights under the state consti-
tution to what the court variously called “aid-in-dying,” 
“assisted death,” and “physician-assisted suicide.”50 
The ruling heartened proponents of PAS. However, a 
close look at the opinion reveals that, even if affirmed 
by the state supreme court, the district court decision 
is unlikely to have any impact at all on other states.
First, Robert Baxter and other plaintiffs in the case 
withdrew their due process claim. Second, the Mon-
tana district court rejected their equal protection 
argument.
[One] who chooses to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment is entitled to do so based on the right to be 
free from an intrusion on [one’s] bodily integrity 
without [one’s] consent. What that individual 
seeks is essentially a negative act — that the physi-
cian refrain from action or curtail an action already 
taken, which permits nature to take its course. 
Baxter, however, seeks an affirmative act from his 
physician intended to hasten death.51
The rejection of the “equal protection” argument is 
significant for two reasons. One, death resulting from 
the withholding of life-sustaining treatment has been 
specifically exempted from the prohibition against 
homicide by the Montana legislature,52 thus height-
ening the disparity in treatment between terminally 
ill people dependent on life-sustaining medical pro-
cedures and terminally ill people who are not depen-
dent on such procedures. Second, as the district court 
noted, “Montana applies broader equal protection to 
its citizens than that provided by the United States 
Constitution.”53
What, then, was the basis for the Montana court’s 
ruling? Two provisions of the Montana Constitution 
not found in most state constitutions. One states that 
a human being’s “dignity” is “inviolable”;54 the other 
tells us that “the right of privacy” “shall not be infringed 
without the showing of a compelling state interest.”55 
As the district court saw the case, “the [state] consti-
tutional rights to privacy and dignity are intertwined 
insofar as they apply to Plaintiff ’s assertion that com-
petent terminal patients have the right to determine 
the timing of their death….”56
The Montana court noted that so far “no [Ameri-
can] court of final jurisdiction has determined that an 
individual has a right, under either federal or state con-
stitutional protections,” to “‘physician-assisted suicide’ 
under even the limited circumstances here.”57 This is 
still true. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme 
Court of Montana will affirm the district court. But 
even if it does — even if it becomes the first American 
court of final jurisdiction to establish a right to PAS — 
it will only be interpreting special, and unusual, provi-
sions of one particular state constitution.
III. Defending the Distinction between 
“Killing” and “Letting Die”
A. Refusing vs. Terminating Medical Treatment
Few, if any, would deny that a terminally ill person — or 
for that matter anybody — has a right to refuse LSMT 
in the first place.58 But should a line be drawn between 
withholding and withdrawing LSMT? It seems fairly 
clear that there is a psychological difference between 
(a) letting patients decline treatment or not selecting 
them for treatment and (b) “terminating” somebody 
already on treatment.59
But how much sense does it make to draw a line 
between (a) not starting a particular treatment and 
(b) stopping it after it has begun? As Professor Dan 
Brock has pointed out, it will often be unclear how 
effective a particular treatment will turn out to be. 
“The treatment is usually worth trying to see whether 
it has the hoped-for-positive effect.”60 But if the treat-
ment proves to be of little or no benefit, there is a rea-
son to stop it which did not exist before the treatment 
started.61 This is especially true when the patient is 
willing to try experimental therapy.62
Critics of the distinction between “killing” and “let-
ting die” like to point out that taking patients off life-
sustaining treatment feels “active,” not “passive.”63 
But discontinuing LSMT cannot be separated from 
starting it. If patients could choose what might (or 
might not) prove to be useful LSMT, but are forced 
to continue treatment once it started — even though 
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it turned out to be unhelpful and distressful — many 
probably would not agree to the treatment in the first 
place. This is why the right to choose treatment has to 
mean the right to discontinue it as well.
B. The Importance of the Right to Forgo Life-
Preserving Treatment
As noted earlier, most of the two million people who die 
in this country every year do so after forgoing life-sus-
taining medical treatment.64 If such treatment could 
not be rejected, enormous numbers of people would 
be “at the mercy of every technological advance.”65
While legalizing PAS (or active voluntary euthana-
sia) would put the entire population at risk, a right to 
forgo LSMT “puts at risk only the lives of those who 
would die without treatment.”66 And when forgoing 
life support is under serious consideration, it is usu-
ally because the patient is “very bad off indeed”67 and 
“likely to die soon no matter what is done.”68
As John Arras observed a decade ago:
[T]he practice of forgoing treatment is by now so 
deeply embedded in our social and medical prac-
tice that a reversal of policy on this point would 
throw most of our major medical institutions into a 
state expressing chaos. The same cannot be said of 
a refusal to honor requests for PAS and euthanasia. 
Thus while there may be many overlapping simi-
larities between withholding treatment and partici-
pating in PAS or euthanasia, their respective denial 
at the level of social policy would entail vastly dif-
ferent individual and social consequences.69
Timothy Quill has emphasized that:
[S]ometimes the same interventions that we use 
to keep people alive…can prolong the process of 
dying.… If we are going to use the wonders of 
modern medicine, we have to learn how not to 
use them, to stop using them at some point if the 
circumstances of the patient changes or the goals 
change.70
But 21 years ago, before Timothy Quill had become a 
famous name, another person was saying essentially 
the same thing. He was a Roman Catholic Cardinal 
named Joseph Bernadin.71 Speaking at a conference 
held at the University of Chicago hospital, he stood 
up, pointed to the many people being kept alive in the 
floors above him, and then continued:
We know that it is fairly easy for technology or 
medicine to become an end in itself, and for life to 
be preserved when, in fact, death should be allowed 
to happen….
… I am…convinced that we are not morally obliged 
to do everything that is technically possible.…
[T]here are cases where we would not be obliged 
artificially to provide nutrition and hydration.…
If we do not resolve this critical issue in a way that 
resonates with the common sense of people of good 
will, then we may contribute to the sense of desper-
ation that will lead people to consider euthanasia 
as an alternative solution to the problem.72
Cardinal Bernadin and Dr. Quill have said essentially 
the same thing for some of the same reasons. But I ven-
ture to say they did so for different reasons as well. Dr. 
Quill (and his co-authors) have recognized the possibil-
ity that some day the “reasoning applied to treatment-
refusal cases could also be applied to physician-assisted 
death.”73 On the other hand, I am confident that the 
Cardinal was well aware, to quote the New York State 
Task Force Report, that denying patients the right to 
forgo life-sustaining treatment would “fuel the move-
ment for assisted suicide and euthanasia, a movement 
that draws considerable strength from public fears of 
an intolerable death prolonged by medical advances.”74 
C. Can the “Killing”/“Letting Die” Distinction Be 
Defended on Pragmatic Grounds?
At least since the publication of James Rachels’s influ-
ential paper75 on what has been called the “moral 
equivalence hypothesis” (the view that PAS or active 
voluntary euthanasia must be as moral, or as immoral, 
as allowing a patient to die by forgoing LSMT), a 
goodly number of ethicists and philosophers have 
rejected the distinction between “killing” and “letting 
die.”76 This was bad enough. But for me the worst was 
yet to come. Several years before the U.S. Supreme 
Court handed down its decisions in Glucksberg and 
Quill, a renowned law professor, Sanford Kadish, con-
cluded that the “killing”/“letting die” distinction could 
not “withstand principled analysis.”77 
I had to wince. When someone calls your views on 
any issue “unprincipled,” it hurts — and it especially 
does when the person making that charge is probably 
the greatest American criminal law scholar of his gen-
eration. However, Professor Kadish was quick to add:
I do not mean to suggest that the law cannot justi-
fiably make distinctions on pragmatic grounds; it 
frequently does so for all kinds of prudential con-
siderations. I mean only to suggest that the distinc-
tions under discussion cannot be defended except 
on pragmatic grounds….78
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It isn’t hard to surmise why courts have drawn 
back from the conclusion that there is no difference 
between suicide and refusal of treatment. To accept 
it would be to acknowledge a radical break with the 
received tradition and open the door to positions 
the courts are not yet willing to adopt: for example, 
that the state may not act to prevent suicide (except 
perhaps temporarily to assure competent consent), 
or to prevent a person from assisting another’s 
suicide, or conceivably even to prevent one person 
from killing another who competently consents to 
being killed.… [By] not distinguishing suicide and 
consensual euthanasia [from refusal of treatment], 
the courts would by implication be endorsing 
these positions in principle. Yet this would be the 
greatest affront to the moral tradition. The courts, 
therefore, have chosen to improvise lines of distinc-
tion, even at the cost of some coherence….79
I for one am not prepared to defend the distinction 
between “killing” and “letting die” on “principled” 
grounds.  (I hasten to add, however, that, as I try to 
spell out in the next section, some of the distinctions 
drawn by PAS proponents cannot be defended on prin-
cipled grounds either.)  But for reasons I shall discuss 
below, I do believe that, as Professor Kadish has sug-
gested, the distinction can be defended on plausible 
pragmatic grounds.
Since the Karen Ann Quinlan era, the medical profes-
sion “has made great strides prolonging life.”80 As Tim-
othy Quill has recently reminded us, “while the array 
of medical choices faced by patients and families has 
grown more complex, ethics and law remain clear that 
patients have a right both to forgo such treatments and 
to stop them once started.”81 I doubt this would have 
occurred if a line had not been drawn between “killing” 
and “letting die.” Nor am I alone in this belief.
Norman Cantor, a proponent of PAS,82 recognizes 
that “constructive changes” in medical ethics “have 
won the acceptance of legal authorities in part because 
the new pattern strives to preserve the pre-existing 
legal framework.”83 By “constructive changes,” Profes-
sor Cantor means changes brought about by “extraor-
dinary advances in medical technology” which have 
rendered the traditional medical approach — utilize 
all possible means to forestall death — “inhumane 
because of its capacity to extend existence beyond all 
‘natural bounds.’”84 Cantor continues:
A sharp distinction between managing medical 
intervention and introducing external death-caus-
ing agents is an integral part of the existing legal 
framework. Physicians, patients, courts and legis-
latures have become increasingly comfortable with 
this distinction….
None of [various] adaptations of legal doctrine 
could have occurred if active euthanasia [and, I 
would add, PAS] had been the issue.
… Giving content and precise meaning to humane 
medical treatment (or non-treatment) is challenge 
enough without adding complications by altering 
the existing legal framework.85 
Another proponent of PAS, Alan Meisel, has 
observed:
[The consensus that has emerged from the Quin-
lan case] acknowledge[s] a clear awareness of the 
distinction between passively and actively hasten-
ing death. Courts and legislatures are mindful of 
this distinction and have taken special pains to 
distinguish the two forms of hastening death. In 
fact, it is fair to say that this distinction has been 
the bedrock of the consensus. Without this distinc-
tion, it is doubtful…that the legal consensus about 
forgoing life-sustaining treatment would have 
evolved….86 As proponents embarked on the legiti-
mation of passively hastening death, courts recog-
Since the Karen Ann Quinlan era, the medical profession “has made  
great strides prolonging life.” As Timothy Quill has recently reminded us, 
“while the array of medical choices faced by patients and families has  
grown more complex, ethics and law remain clear that patients have  
a right both to forgo such treatments and to stop them once started.”  
I doubt this would have occurred if a line had not been drawn between 
“killing” and “letting die.” Nor am I alone in this belief.
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nized that making and emphasizing the distinction 
between passively and actively hastening death met 
a symbolic, and perhaps real, need to preserve the 
fundamental societal prohibition of killing inno-
cent human beings.87
Professor Meisel is hardly the only commentator in 
the field to speak of symbolism.
Norman Cantor has observed that “the best moral 
and ethical justification for different treatment of 
withdrawal of life support and provision of a poison 
is the promotion of society’s symbolic interest in the 
sanctity of life.”88 David Orentlicher has suggested 
that initially the prohibition against PAS served as “a 
useful proxy for separating morally valid and morally 
invalid” patient requests for a physician’s assistance in 
dying.89
Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel has gone so far as to say — and 
I suspect this will discomfit more than a few — that to 
a large extent the entire debate is about the symbolism 
of the physician. After observing that dying or seri-
ously ill patients “do not live with empty medical cabi-
nets”90 — many, especially those dying of cancer and 
AIDS, “have more than enough narcotics and sleeping 
pills to end their own lives”91 — Emanuel maintains 
that the physician’s involvement in assisted suicide (or 
voluntary euthanasia) “medicalizes the suicide” and 
thus “legitimizes” it:
Professional medical assistance for suicide does not 
dignify the means so much as it does the act itself. 
Professional assistance medicalizes the suicide in 
a manner that legitimizes the act. By providing the 
life-ending prescription or injecting the life-ending 
drug, the doctor in the white coat, the authority fig-
ure imbued with elevated social standing and pres-
tige, adds social sanction to the act of intentionally 
ending one’s life. By participating as a recognized 
authority figure, the physician conveys society’s 
view that this action is appropriate and worthy.92
IV. Are Some Distinctions Drawn by PAS 
Proponents “Unprincipled”?
A. The Distinction between PAS and Active Voluntary 
Euthanasia (AVE)
In 1996, nine authors from the fields of law, medicine, 
philosophy, and economics proposed a model statute to 
authorize and regulate PAS.93 But they did not address 
active voluntary euthanasia (AVE) because they told 
us that “we disagree among ourselves” as to whether 
there is “an important difference” between PAS and 
AVE.94 The nine authors gave two reasons why they 
chose to authorize only PAS: (1) restricting the statute 
to PAS “provides in many cases a stronger assurance 
of the patient’s voluntary resolve to die” and (2) there 
would be “greater acceptance” of the proposed model 
statute if it were limited to PAS “partly because of the 
public perception of voluntariness and partly because 
of the strong ethical objections of some physicians and 
others to euthanasia.”95
Professor Kadish likes to remind me that the fact 
that the proponent of a principle (or policy) stops 
short of the principle’s ultimate logic does not neces-
sarily mean that the proponent is “strategizing.” The 
proponent may have simply decided that the social 
consequences of the principle in the real world justify 
a shorter stopping point. Nevertheless, in this instance 
I cannot resist the conclusion that proponents of PAS 
were “strategizing.”
“Euthanasia,” Professor Dan Brock once observed, 
is a term that has “strong emotionally laden con-
notations.”96 This strikes me as an understatement. 
Although when it first appeared in the English lan-
guage centuries ago, it meant “a gentle, easy death”97; 
for many, it has long since become an offensive, scary 
term. PAS proponents are likely to fear, and with good 
cause, that their proposal would be unpalatable if it 
were linked to AVE.
The unattractiveness of the label “euthanasia” could 
not have escaped the notice of PAS proponents. They 
are quite sensitive about terminology.98 For example, 
although the term “physician-assisted suicide” is itself 
a relatively new neologism — perhaps no more than 
20 years old99 — a number of its proponents have been 
unhappy with it for some time. They consider “suicide” 
too harsh a term to use to describe the “bring[ing] 
about [of] a peaceful and dignified death.”100 As Kath-
ryn Tucker, the Director of Legal Affairs for Compas-
sion & Choices, has recently observed:
The term “assisted suicide” has been replaced with 
more accurate and value-neutral terms such as 
“aid in dying” or “physician-assisted dying.” The 
only active opponents of this evolution in terminol-
ogy are opponents of the practice who continue 
to malign the choice for aid in dying by labeling it 
“suicide.”101
But isn’t “physician-assisted suicide” or “physician-
assisted death” or “aid-in-dying” or whatever one calls 
it likely to slide into euthanasia?
During the oral arguments in the Quill case, Justice 
Ginsburg wondered why a patient who is so weak or 
helpless — or in so much agony — that she is unable 
to swallow the lethal pills herself should be denied 
the death she seeks because she cannot participate 
in her own suicide. She suggested that such a patient 
is “in a more sympathetic situation,” i.e., has a stron-
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ger claim to the death she seeks, than a person who is 
able to end her life with the preliminary assistance of 
a physician.102 
Then there is the problem of botched suicides. As 
Professor Cantor has pointed out:
Because physicians are not skilled at killing by poi-
sons, some instances will occur where a patient’s 
suicide attempt fails and a physician will be called 
upon to administer a coup de grace. In the Nether-
lands, approximately 18% of assisted suicides result 
in serious complications or fail to work. The imper-
ative of ending suffering then leads to an alternate 
mode of causing death, usually a lethal injection.103 
In 1992, Professor Quill and his co-authors drew a 
firm line between PAS and AVE. They stopped short of 
AVE “because of the risk of abuse it presents.”104 They 
favored only PAS because in that situation “the final act 
is solely the patient’s” and therefore “the risk of subtle 
coercion” from physicians and family members is 
“greatly reduced,” and the “balance of power” between 
physician and patient “is more nearly equal.”105
Daniel Callahan and Margot White sharply chal-
lenged the grounds Quill and his co-authors gave for 
distinguishing between PAS and AVE:
To insinuate the idea of suicide into the mind of 
someone already grievously suffering can surely 
be no more difficult than insinuating the idea of 
euthanasia….
As for the power of doctors, their general prestige 
as professionals, who with training and experience 
are widely thought to understand better matters of 
life and death than the rest of us, and their capacity 
to give or withhold lethal drugs, already establishes 
the power differential between themselves and 
their patients.106
Callahan and White are both opponents of PAS. Dan 
Brock, on the other hand, is a leading proponent of PAS. 
Yet Professor Brock attacked the line Professor Quill and 
his colleagues had drawn between PAS and AVE even 
more emphatically than did Callahan and White.
Brock perceived “no significant, intrinsic moral dis-
tinction” between PAS and AVE.107 He found it “hard 
to see why public or legal policy should permit one but 
not the other.”108 He maintained that “worries about 
abuse or about giving anyone dominion over the lives 
of others applies equally to either”:109
In physician-assisted suicide the patient acts last…
whereas in euthanasia the physician acts last by 
performing the physical equivalent of pushing the 
button. In both cases, however, the choice rests 
fully with the patient. In both the patient acts last 
in the sense of retaining the right to change his or 
her mind until the point at which the lethal process 
becomes irreversible….110
A short two years after he had balked at doing so, Dr. 
Quill crossed the line between PAS and AVE. Along with 
four colleagues he endorsed “physician-assisted death” 
(PAD), a term that embraces both PAS and AVE:
To confine legalized physician-assisted death to 
assisted suicide unfairly discriminates against 
patients with unbelievable suffering who resolve to 
end their lives but are physically unable to do so. 
The method chosen is less important than the care-
ful assessment that precedes assisted death.111
Quill was not the only co-author of the 1994 article 
who, shortly after drawing a line short of AVE, decided 
to cross it. Two other commentators who co-authored 
the 1994 article — Lawrence Gostin and Diane Meier 
— also changed their views, feeling the need to cross 
the line in certain instances.112
The fact that in a short span of time three well-known 
commentators decided they could no longer rule out 
AVE completely — because doing so “unfairly discrim-
inates” against certain patients — strikes me as further 
evidence that if and when PAS is widely adopted, the 
thin line between PAS and AVE is unlikely to hold.
B. Limiting the Right to PAS to the Terminally Ill
Both in their briefs and during their oral arguments 
before the Supreme Court, the lawyers for Doctors 
Glucksberg and Quill emphasized that they were 
seeking PAS only for “terminally ill” patients (often 
defined as a condition or illness that will result in 
death within six months’ time) or for those at “the 
threshold of death” or those “facing imminent and 
inevitable death.”113 This led Justice Ginsberg to com-
ment that “[a] lot of people [other than the terminally 
ill] would fit this category,” i.e., would rather die than 
experience continued pain, suffering, or indignity.114 
How, she asked, “do you…leave out the rest of the 
world who would fit the same standards?”115 If, as one 
of the most eloquent proponents of PAS, Dan Brock, 
has maintained, “the right not to be killed, like other 
rights, should be waivable when the patient makes a 
competent decision” that continued life is “worse than 
no further life at all,”116 why should this right be lim-
ited to the terminally ill?
Ronald Dworkin and five other prominent moral 
philosophers who filed an amicus brief in Glucksberg 
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and Quill argued, on behalf of the patient-plaintiffs, 
that “individuals have a constitutionally protected 
interest in making those grave judgments for them-
selves [about how they should confront their death or 
when it is appropriate to ask others for help in has-
tening their death] free from the imposition of any 
religious or philosophical orthodoxy by court or leg-
islature.”117 If so, why should the right — and how can 
it — be limited to the terminally ill?
It is worth recalling that until their rulings were 
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, both the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals proceeded 
on the premise that there is no significant difference 
between PAS and the right to forgo LSMT.118 But the 
right to forgo LSMT has not been limited to the termi-
nally ill. Indeed, it is “virtually absolute.”119 As Norman 
Cantor has emphasized:
[A] medical patient’s prerogative — grounded in 
self-determination and bodily integrity — to reject 
life-sustaining medical interventions.…attaches no 
matter how slight the bodily intrusions contem-
plated, no matter how long the patient’s existence 
could potentially be preserved, and no matter how 
foolish the patient’s decision might seem to health 
care providers and others.120
So if and when a right to PAS is established in a case 
involving a terminally ill patient, presumably on the 
ground that there is no significant legal or ethical dif-
ference between PAS and the right to forgo LSMT, 
why would we expect the ruling to be limited to the 
terminally ill?
In his introduction to The Philosophers’ Brief, Pro-
fessor Dworkin does recognize that the states may 
set some limits on the right to PAS: because people 
sometimes make life-and-death decisions “when their 
act does not reflect their enduring convictions,” states 
may be allowed “to overrule that right in order to pro-
tect citizens from mistaken but irrevocable acts of self-
destruction.”121 The states may do this, explains Dwor-
kin, “to prevent assisted suicide by people who — it 
is plausible to think — would later be grateful if they 
were prevented from dying.”122
Dworkin tells us that he had in mind “a state’s pro-
tecting a disappointed adolescent from himself.”123 
That is an easy case. What about the hard ones: The 
person paralyzed from the chest down who has ten 
years to live? The badly disabled and disfigured sur-
vivor of a car accident or fire who has 20 years to life? 
Someone in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease, 
anticipating and fearing mental deterioration several 
years down the road?
Also in the introduction of his book, Dworkin takes 
notice of the fact that during the oral arguments one 
or more Supreme Court Justices wondered whether, 
if the right to PAS for the terminally ill were granted 
in Glucksberg and Quill, the right could or should be 
confined to that relatively small group.124 Professor 
Dworkin then framed the question: why should PAS 
be denied “to patients who are not dying but face years 
of intolerable physical or emotional pain or crippling 
paralysis or dependence?”125
But Dworkin never really answers his own question. 
All he has to say about it is that if his side had pre-
vailed in the Supreme Court, “the federal courts would 
no doubt be faced with a succession of cases in years 
to come testing whether, for example, it is plausible to 
assume that a desperately crippled patient in constant 
pain but with years to live, who has formed a settled 
and repeatedly stated wish to die, would one day be 
forced to stay alive.”126
But if the right to PAS for the terminally ill had been 
established in Glucksberg and Quill, and the “desper-
ately crippled person” with “a settled and repeatedly 
stated wish to die” had tried to apply the new ruling 
to her situation, what would there have been left to 
argue about? We have already been told that in the 
hypothetical case the person had “a settled and repeat-
edly stated wish to die.” How many more times does 
she have to repeat her wish to die before the court is 
convinced she will not change her mind?
I venture to say that because he believes that the 
right to PAS ought to be regarded as a constitutionally 
protected “momentous personal decision” comparable 
to getting married or having children,127 Professor 
Dworkin cannot bring himself to say that if Glucksberg 
and Quill had been decided in his favor, then the per-
son in his hypothetical would have been denied relief 
because he was not terminally ill. On the other hand, 
Dworkin seems unwilling to say (for now, at any rate) 
that if the PAS cases had been decided in his favor, the 
non-terminally ill person in his hypothetical would 
almost certainly have gained such a right as well. (I 
believe this is so.) This may explain why Dworkin falls 
back on the state’s authority to prevent assisted sui-
cide by those who might “later be grateful if they were 
prevented from dying.”
Such an argument may be persuasive when the 
state is “protecting a disappointed adolescent from 
himself.”128 But the argument loses much of its force 
when we are dealing with someone like the person in 
Professor Dworkin’s hypothetical — a non-terminally 
ill person who no longer wants to continue living in 
the intolerable existence she has already been dealing 
with for months or years.
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In recent years, most PAS proponents have concen-
trated on the terminally ill. It is not hard to figure out 
why. A PAS right limited to the terminally ill would 
cause less alarm and command more support than 
would a broader right. As nine PAS proponents noted 
more than a decade ago, terminally ill patients “have 
generally been seen as the least controversial candi-
dates for the recognition of the right to die.”129
As a matter of principle, however, it is difficult to 
see how one could limit PAS to the terminally ill. In 
many instances the non-terminally ill person will have 
been thinking that death is better than continued life 
for a longer time than the terminally ill patient. In 
many, perhaps most, cases the non-terminally ill per-
son who prefers death over continued life (a) may have 
already suffered more pain, indignity and degradation 
than the terminally ill person or (b) will surely do so if 
forced to stay alive.130
Up to this point, I have assumed that “terminally 
ill” is a manageable classification. But there are seri-
ous doubts about this. Daniel Callahan and Margot 
White have warned us that “[t]he few studies that 
have been done indicate that the designation of six 
months as a terminal period is entirely arbitrary and 
that physicians vary drastically in their interpretation 
of what constitutes this terminal phase of illness.”131 
A five-hospital empirical study by Professor Joanne 
Lynn and five other health professionals led them to 
issue another warning: “[d]eciding who should be 
counted ‘terminally ill’ will pose such severe difficul-
ties that it seems untenable as a criterion for permit-
ting [PAS].”132
I could not end this section without recalling that 
when more than a decade ago, nine persons from law, 
medicine, and philosophy joined together to draft a 
model state act authorizing and regulating PAS, one 
of the issues they had to resolve was whether to limit 
PAS to the terminally ill. What did they decide?
Although the nine authors recognized that “the 
restriction of the right to the terminally ill establishes 
a boundary that helps to address slippery slope con-
cerns,”133 they went beyond that boundary. Concerned 
about people who suffer greatly from such illnesses “as 
AIDS, advanced emphysema, some forms of cancer, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s disease), 
multiple sclerosis, and many other debilitating condi-
tions” — but “who are not likely to die from their ill-
nesses within six months”134 — “a bare majority of us 
agreed to allow anyone to be eligible whose illness is 
incurable and who subjectively feels that the accom-
panying suffering is worse than death.”135
V. Palliative Care, the Principle of Double 
Effect, and Terminal Sedation
It is difficult to be precise about the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in the 1997 Glucksberg and Quill cases for two 
reasons: (1) although Justice O’Connor purported to 
join Chief Justice Rehnquist’s four-person opinion, 
thus making it “the opinion of the Court,” it is doubtful 
she really did so;136 and (2) the four remaining mem-
bers of the Court wrote either cryptic or wide-ranging 
concurring opinions.
However, some things are clear. For example, it is 
clear that the Court approved the principle of double 
effect (PDE) — the view that “it is moral [and lawful] 
to administer high-dose narcotics to dying patients, 
even though there may be some risk of hastening 
death, whereas it is not moral to administer an over-
dose of such drugs deliberately to cause death.”137
In the case that came to be known as Glucksberg, 
the Ninth Circuit had, as Professor Howard Brody 
described it, “dismiss[ed]” the double effect principle 
as “moral hypocrisy.”138 The Ninth Circuit could “see 
little, if any, difference for constitutional or ethical 
purposes between providing medication with a double 
effect and…with a single effect, as long as one of the 
known effects in each case is to hasten the end of the 
patient’s life.”139
The U.S. Supreme viewed the matter very differ-
ently. It left no doubt that it is permissible for a physi-
cian to provide “painkilling drugs [even though they] 
may hasten a patient’s death” so long as “the physi-
cian’s purpose and intent is, or may be, only to ease 
his patient’s pain.”140 It also quoted with approval a 
statement from the New York State Task Force Report 
that the PDE is “widely recognized” as “ethically and 
professionally acceptable.”141
Whatever position a person takes on PAS or eutha-
nasia, everyone should welcome the Supreme Court’s 
approval of the PDE in the medical context. As Pro-
fessor Brody pointed out shortly after the Ninth Cir-
cuit handed down its decision (and shortly before the 
Supreme Court overturned it):
[I]f the court is allowed to make the case that 
double effect deaths are morally no different from 
assisting a patient’s suicide, then a large number of 
practitioners — perhaps one-third — would have 
strong moral grounds for refusing to treat terminal 
pain with adequate doses of opiods. The impact on 
medicine’s already suboptimal level of compassion-
ate care of terminal suffering could be disastrous.142
In a way, however, the High Court’s approval of the 
PDE was a special victory for those opposed to PAS 
and euthanasia. For they have long defended the prin-
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ciple.143 But some proponents of PAS have criticized 
the PDE, condemning the supposed hypocrisy in per-
mitting the use of pain relief to hasten death while 
prohibiting PAS (or voluntary euthanasia).144
As the American Medical Association and some 40 
other medical and health care organizations main-
tained in the amicus brief they filed in the Glucksberg 
case, “properly trained health care professionals can 
effectively meet their patients’ needs for compassion-
ate end-of-life care without acceding to requests for 
suicide.”145 The PDE makes the goal of health care pro-
fessionals more attainable — and weakens the case for 
PAS.
How far does the “double effect” principle extend? 
For example, does it have any bearing on a procedure 
called “terminal sedation” (TS) which was mentioned 
in the Quill oral arguments? Those who talk or read 
about “terminal sedation” (TS) are likely to run into a 
flurry of words and phrases. To avoid, or at least mini-
mize confusion, we should use terminology carefully.
To begin with, neither sedation of the terminally ill 
nor heavy sedation nor sedation to the point of uncon-
sciousness is TS. When most commentators refer to 
TS, when I do, and most important, I think when 
Dr. Quill’s lawyer, Professor Laurence Tribe, did in 
his Supreme Court argument, what we all mean is a 
two-step procedure: (1) sedating the patient to uncon-
sciousness and (2) withholding artificial nutrition and 
hydration (ANH).
At the risk of complicating matters further, I have to 
add that at least one prominent commentator, Norman 
Cantor, has used the term “deep sedation” to cover sev-
eral different procedures, at least one of which appears 
to be what others call “terminal sedation.”146 To make 
matters still more confusing, as Professor Margaret 
Battin has pointed out, TS has also been called “pallia-
tive sedation,” “continuous deep sedation,” and “slow 
euthanasia.”147
The second step of TS — the withholding of ANH 
— is a crucial component of the procedure. It is the 
feature that makes the permissibility of the procedure 
problematic. This point did not escape Professor Quill 
and his co-authors:
[T]he doctrine of double effect distinguishes 
between effects that a person intends (both the end 
sought and the means taken to the end) and conse-
quences that are foreseen but unintended….
… [I]t seems implausible to claim that death is 
unintended when a patient who wants to die is 
sedated to the point of coma, and intravenous flu-
ids and artificial nutrition are withheld, making 
death certain. Although the overarching intention 
of the sedation is to relieve the patient’s suffering, 
the additional step of withholding fluids and nutri-
tion is not needed to relieve pain, but is typically 
taken to hasten the patient’s wished-for death. In 
contrast, when patients are similarly sedated to 
treat [other conditions] therapies such as fluids 
and mechanical ventilation are continued with the 
goal of prolonging life.148
I share the view that TS is a worrisome practice.149 
I also understand why, “because the sedated patient 
often dies from the combination of two intentional acts 
by the physician — the induction of stupor or uncon-
sciousness and the withholding of food and water”150 
— Professor David Orentlicher calls it “essentially 
‘slow euthanasia.’”151 But I have great difficulty follow-
ing Professor Orentlicher when he arrives at the con-
clusion that in the 1997 PAS cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court “accept[ed],” “embrac[ed],” “endors[ed],” and 
“encourage[ed] the availability of ” TS.152 Where and 
how did the Court do this?
Pointing at footnote 11 to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion in Vacco v. Quill, Orentlicher tells us that 
“the five-justice majority opinion expressly reject[ed] 
the claim that terminal sedation ‘is covert physician-
assisted suicide.’”153 As I read footnote 11, however, the 
Court did no such thing.
The Court simply quoted the argument in Dr. Quill’s 
brief (“Respondents…argue that the State irrationally 
distinguishes between physician-assisted suicide and 
‘terminal sedation,’ a process respondents characterize 
as ‘induc[ing] barbiturate coma and then starv[ing] 
the person to death’”) and the response to that argu-
How far does the “double effect” principle extend? For example, does it have 
any bearing on a procedure called “terminal sedation” which was mentioned 
in the Quill oral arguments? Those who talk or read about “terminal sedation” 
are likely to run into a flurry of words and phrases. To avoid, or at least 
minimize confusion, we should use terminology carefully.
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ment in New York’s brief (“[a]lthough proponents of 
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia contend 
that terminal sedation is covert assisted-suicide or 
euthanasia, the concept of sedating pharmacotherapy 
is based on informed consent and the principle of dou-
ble effect”).154
New York State rejected the claim that TS is 
“covert physician-assisted suicide” — not the Court.155 
Nowhere in footnote 11 does Rehnquist say anything 
about TS.
After quoting from the opposing briefs, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist did embark on a brief general discus-
sion of palliative care (consisting of nine lines in the 
official reports). But he discussed only the permissibil-
ity of palliative care “which may have the foreseen but 
unintended ‘double effect’ of hastening the patient’s 
death.”156 In the course of this general discussion, Reh-
nquist quoted with approval from the New York State 
Task Force Report, once again referring to the “double 
effect” principle: “[T]he provision of pain medicine is 
ethically and professionally acceptable even when the 
treatment may hasten the patient’s death, if the medi-
cation is intended to alleviate pain and severe discom-
fort, not to cause death.”157
But what does all this “double effect” talk have to do 
with TS? “If one intends to hasten death, one is no lon-
ger employing the principle of double effect, and one 
can no longer seek shelter under its moral umbrella.”158 
Professor Orentlicher is well aware of the necessarily 
intentional quality of TS and the inapplicability of the 
PDE when evaluating the practice.159 This is why he 
calls TS “slow euthanasia.”160
The repeated references to the “double effect” prin-
ciple in footnote 11 lead me to conclude that Rehn-
quist did not have the special TS procedure in mind 
when he discussed palliative care generally. If Rehn-
quist had been trying to defend TS on “double effect” 
grounds, one would have expected him to explain how 
a medical practice which combined sedating a patient 
to unconsciousness and the withholding of ANH could 
be reconciled with the PDE. But Rehnquist did not do 
this. Nowhere in footnote 11 did he focus on or even 
indicate he was aware of the special problems raised 
by the special process known as TS.
Rehnquist may have been led astray by the quota-
tion from Paul Rousseau’s article, which did invoke 
the PDE. It is also possible that Rehnquist may have 
failed to grasp the distinction between (1) sedation 
that causes unconsciousness and hastens death and 
(2) such sedation plus the withholding of ANH.161 But 
I fail to see how one can say, on the basis of footnote 
eleven, that the Supreme Court approved TS.
Professor Orentlicher also maintains that “three 
concurring Supreme Court Justices endorse[d]” TS,162 
pointing to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Glucksberg and Quill.163 But much of what I have said 
about footnote 11 to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
applies to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion as 
well. She never refers to TS or any of its synonyms, 
such as “deep sedation.” Although she talks about the 
availability of palliative care to relieve suffering, “even 
to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening 
death,”164 she has nothing whatsoever to say about the 
“withholding of ANH” component to such sedation.
As Norman Cantor notes, “[n]one of the sources 
that Justice O’Connor cites with regard to hastening 
death confirms the legality of withholding ANH in the 
course of long-term sedation.”165 Justice O’Connor does 
say at one point that the states involved in the litigation 
(New York and Washington) “agree that in these States 
a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and 
who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to 
obtaining medication…to alleviate that suffering, even 
to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening 
death.”166 But if O’Connor were including TS, then this 
statement would not be accurate, for New York had 
argued that if TS were taking place in its state (which 
it doubted), it would “unquestionably [be] outside the 
bounds of accepted medical practice.”167
Orentlicher also told us that concurring Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer, as well as Justice O’Connor, 
approved TS. But I am unable to find any support for 
that conclusion either.168
In short, to conclude, as Professor Orentlicher does, 
that either the Court (on the basis of footnote 11) or 
the three Justices “endorsed” the medical procedure 
known as TS strikes me as quite a leap.
Some day the Court will have to focus on TS. When 
it does, will it uphold its legality? One may argue that 
TS is essentially an embellished form of forgoing ANH. 
After all, if patients so desire, they can have ANH with-
held or withdrawn. So why should TS be prohibited? 
On the other hand, one may argue that the second 
component of TS — the withholding of ANH — colors 
the first component — sedation to the point of uncon-
sciousness. The second component indicates that the 
overall purpose of TS is not to relieve the pain, but to 
kill the patient.
Although physicians trying to “kill the pain” may 
provide pain relief which increases the risk of death, 
they may not purposely “kill the patient” in order to kill 
the pain. “The uniform judicial position in the United 
States that euthanasia is always unjustified homicide 
reflects a view that pain relief can never outweigh the 
harm of purposely causing a premature death.”169
When the Court does resolve the issue, we can be 
sure of one thing — the decision will involve some fine 
line-drawing. In the meantime, I believe that the best 
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that can be said for TS is what Norman Cantor has 
said — the sequence of sedation to the point of uncon-
sciousness followed by the withholding of ANH takes 
us into “legally uncharted territory.”170
VI. Some Concluding Remarks
A decade ago, in an effort to get a better grasp of how 
physicians and medical ethicists would react to a 
heart-wrenching case — one that seemed to call out 
for PAS/euthanasia — I studied the writings of three 
of the staunchest opponents of PAS: John Arras, Eze-
kiel Emanuel, and Mark Siegler.171 It soon became 
clear that none of them objected to physicians help-
ing their patients commit suicide in extraordinarily 
compelling cases; what they were opposed to was the 
enactment of laws formally authorizing PAS under any 
circumstances.
Thus, Siegler balked at “tak[ing] the chance of 
legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia” in order to 
satisfy the needs of a small group of patients suffer-
ing “bad” death despite the best efforts of health pro-
fessionals.172 These patients, added Professor Siegler, 
“can often find appropriate care from physicians who 
are sympathetic to their needs.… Prosecutors have 
used considerable discretion in acknowledging the 
rights of patients and doctors to reach certain agree-
ments between themselves.”173
As for Ezekiel Emanuel, he does not think that a 
relatively few heart-wrenching cases can justify the 
legalization of PAS or euthanasia, but neither does 
he believe that physicians should turn their backs on 
patients in exceptionally compelling circumstances: 
“The question is not about whether intervention [i.e., 
PAS or euthanasia] is right for this or that particular 
patient. In any given case it may be the ethical thing to 
do, whatever the law says — and should be done.”174
As for John Arras, he defends the current situa-
tion in the great majority of states. But how does he 
define the current situation? “[A] regime that does not 
legally sanction PAS and euthanasia, but nevertheless 
covertly permits some particularly compassionate 
and courageous physicians to violate the law in fear 
and trembling.”175
It is one thing to close your eyes or turn away when 
another violates a law you support. But Professor 
Arras comes close to applauding the physician who 
violates the prohibition against PAS or euthanasia in 
the heart-wrenching case.
A proponent of PAS is likely to protest that neither 
the views of Arras, Emanuel, or Siegler are consis-
tent.176 But their views provide striking evidence of how 
the PAS/euthanasia issue has confounded and divided 
physicians, lawyers, judges, and medical ethicists.
The debate over PAS/AVE may be seen as a clash 
of fundamental beliefs — personal dignity and auton-
omy versus the laudable view that the law protects all 
innocent human life, no matter how poor its quality 
— a view based on the need to “protect the vulnerable 
and to affirm their connection to society.”177 As Profes-
sor (now Judge) Guido Calabresi once pointed out, 
when fundamental beliefs are in conflict we are forced 
to make “tragic choices” (he specifically mentioned 
euthanasia) — and when we do make them, we often 
try to have it both ways.178
Adamant resistance to legalizing PAS or AVE, but 
a willingness to tolerate the underground practice of 
PAS/AVE, is one means of having it both ways. Even if 
we put aside the underground practice, however, the 
current legal regime in the great majority of states — 
prohibiting the “medical introduction of outside lethal 
forces,”179 but (1) allowing patients to forgo all life-
sustaining treatment and (2) permitting physicians to 
provide pain relief that increases the risk of death — is 
another means of having it both ways.
The current state of affairs in most states with 
respect to PAS/AVE illustrates another point. When 
we must make tragic choices we prefer to do so “in a 
soft light subdued by history, rather than in the bright 
spotlight of utmost analytic clarity.”180 
The debate over PAS/AVE may be seen as a clash of fundamental beliefs — 
personal dignity and autonomy versus the laudable view that the law protects all 
innocent human life, no matter how poor its quality — a view based on the need 
to “protect the vulnerable and to affirm their connection to society.” As Professor 
(now Judge) Guido Calabresi once pointed out, when fundamental beliefs are 
in conflict we are forced to make “tragic choices” (he specifically mentioned 
euthanasia) — and when we do make them, we often try to have it both ways.
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Postscript
Two months after this author presented his paper at the 16th 
Annual Pitts Lectureship, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed 
the district court ruling in Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211 
(Mont.Sup.Ct. 2009). (The district court ruling is discussed at 
notes 50-57 of this paper.) However, the state supreme court based 
its decision on narrower grounds than the lower court had.
In an opinion signed by four of the seven state supreme court 
justices, the Montana Supreme Court vacated the district court’s 
ruling on the state constitutional issues and affirmed the lower 
court’s decision on the alternative ground that under state statu-
tory law (which provides that the consent of the victim constitutes 
a defense to the charge of homicide), the consent of the patient to 
his physician’s “aid in dying” also constitutes a defense to a homi-
cide charge against the physician. The state supreme court recog-
nized that the consent of the victim is not a defense if it is “against 
public policy” to permit the conduct or the resulting harm. But the 
court could find nothing in the case law or the state statutes indi-
cating that physician aid in dying is against public policy.
A fifth state supreme court justice agreed with the majority’s 
analysis of the consent statute, but would have also ruled that 
“physician aid in dying” is protected by the “dignity” and “pri-
vacy” provisions of the state constitution. The remaining two state 
supreme court justices dissented. 
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